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Abstract  
In contrast to the recent multi‐billion dollar bailouts offered to leading sectors of 
capital, fiscal austerity is poised to make a comeback worldwide. Labour will be forced 
to pay for the public debt accumulated in the aftermath of the recent global financial 
and economic crisis.  Notwithstanding change and evolution in the neoliberal model 
over time, this return to austerity is consistent with overall policy in the neoliberal 
period which can be considered an era of permanent restraint in most areas of social 
spending.  This article examines a variety of trends that have emerged over the past 
thirty years of neoliberal rule: the various facets of neoliberal policy and their temporal 
dimensions; as well as the results of market‐reliance and spending reforms: growing 
affluence for a minority of Canadians while the majority lose ground and inequalities 
are further entrenched.  Asking 'austerity for whom' directs attention at the 
interconnections between affluence and austerity that exist in Canada. 
 
Résumé 
Contrairement aux récents plans de sauvetage impliquant des milliards de dollars 
offerts aux principaux secteurs de l’économie, l'austérité budgétaire s’apprête à faire 
un retour à l’échelle planétaire. Les travailleurs n’auront d’autre choix que de 
rembourser la dette publique engendrée à la suite de la récente crise économique et 
financière mondiale. Malgré le changement et l'évolution dans le modèle néo‐libéral au 
fil du temps, ce retour à l'austérité concorde avec la politique globale de la période 
néolibérale pouvant être considérée comme une époque de restrictions permanentes 
touchant la plupart des domaines de dépenses sociales. Cet article examine une série 
de tendances ayant émergé au cours des trente dernières années du pouvoir néo‐
libéral: les différents aspects de la politique néolibérale et leurs dimensions 
temporelles, ainsi que les résultats du recours au marché financier et de la réforme du 
contrôle de la dépense: forte croissance d'une minorité de Canadiens alors que la 
majorité perd du terrain enracinant davantage les inégalités. La question « l’austérité 
pour qui? » dirige l’attention vers l’interconnexion entre l’affluence et l’austérité qui 
existent au Canada.  
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Austerity,	meaning	“the	quality	or	state	of	being	austere”	and	“enforced	or	
extreme	economy,”	was	named	by	the	Merriam	Webster	dictionary	as	its	
Word	of	the	Year	for	2010.1	In	the	aftermath2	of	the	deep	financial	and	
economic	crisis	that	began	in	2007,	most	governments	and	international	
organizations	started	to	emphasise	that	the	bailouts	and	financial	stimulus	
that	they	had	enacted	as	a	response	to	the	prospect	of	financial	and	
economic	meltdown	would	now	have	to	be	paid	for.	In	practice,	under	the	
neo‐liberal	paradigm	that	for	policy‐making	elites	has	retained	its	
dominant	position,	austerity	means	an	economic	and	social	policy	based	on	
“deficit	cutting,	slashed	spending	and	the	mysterious	evaporation	of	
benefits”	(Elmhirst	2010).	Unsurprisingly,	austerity	is	also	on	the	minds	of	
the	web‐browsing	public.	
However,	a	casual	survey	of	press	coverage	of	spending	cuts	and	the	
continuation	of	rewards	to	financial	operatives,	through	bankers’	bonus	
payments	for	example,3	leads	to	the	conclusion	that	austerity	can	hardly	be	
the	only	defining	characteristic	of	our	age.	At	the	very	least,	we	need	to	ask:	
“Austerity	for	Whom?”	–	a	question	that	carries	with	it	the	connotation	that	
if	it	is	austerity	for	some,	it	will	be	affluence	for	others	(see	McBride	and	
Whiteside	2011).	Nevertheless,	though	the	word	itself	has	achieved	greater	
prominence	as	a	result	of	the	2007	crisis,	there	is	a	sense	in	which	
austerity	for	some	has	been	a	permanent	feature	of	the	neoliberal	era.	Still,	
neoliberalism	has	undergone	changes	and	moved	through	a	number	of	
stages	since	it	began	to	dominate	political	discourse.	One	aim	of	this	article	
is	to	chart	elements	of	continuity	whilst	also	being	sensitive	to	new	
developments	and	discontinuities	in	the	long	period	of	neoliberal	
hegemony.	
                                                 
1 For one of many articles reporting this event see Contreras (2010). 
2 “Aftermath” is used conditionally ‐‐ opinions differ on whether that crisis is truly over. 
3 To give just one example, in the UK it was revealed in February 2011 that bankers’ bonuses 
for  2010  would  likely  total  £6  billion  (BBC  2011);  a  few  months  earlier,  in  October,  the 
Chancellor, George Osborne, had  identified £7bn  in extra welfare cuts,  including changes  to 
incapacity, housing benefit and tax credits, amongst broader public sector reductions totaling 
£81 billion (BBC 2010). 
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The	rise	of	neoliberalism	in	the	1970s	was	accompanied	by	various	
claims	that	led	to	the	conclusion	that	the	state,	especially	in	its	role	as	
guarantor	of	full‐employment	and	adequate	social	provision,	should	be	
reduced	in	size	and	the	beneficiaries	of	these	activities	be	made	more	
reliant	on	their	success	in	a	less	regulated	market.	The	1970s	”stagflation”	
crisis	was	frequently	framed	in	terms	of	“wage‐push”	inflation,	a	formula	
suggesting	that	labour	had	become	too	powerful	and	that	its	wage	
demands	were	destabilizing	the	system	through	creating	inflationary	
pressures.		
Considered	either	as	an	accumulation	strategy	or	as	a	policy	
paradigm,	neoliberalism’s	objectives	were	drastic.	Its	primary	objective	
was	not	to	contain	labour,	but	to	roll	back	the	gains	it	had	made	in	the	
post‐war	period.	This	could	occur	directly	through	confrontations	at	the	
bargaining	table,	in	a	context	where	tight	monetary	policy	to	fight	inflation	
had	disciplined	labour	through	increasing	unemployment.	Or,	it	could	
occur	indirectly	through	diminishing	the	state’s	provision	of	the	“social	
wage”	provided	through	various	social	programs.	In	this	early	period,	
“restraint”	or,	sometimes	“retrenchment”	was	the	preferred	descriptor	for	
policies	that	fit	the	definition	of	austerity.	Playing	with	a	common	
definition	of	politics	as	“who	get	what,	when,	where,	how?”,	the	politics	of	
restraint	was	once	described	as	“	who	gets	none	or	who	gets	less	of	what,	
when	and	how?”	(Maslove,	Prince	and	Doern	1986,	205).	
Born	in	the	battle	against	inflation,	neoliberalism	proved	inventive	
in	attaching	itself	to	new	justifications	as	time	proceeded.	As	inflation	
declined,	the	fight	against	it	ceded	priority	to	the	size	of	government	
budget	deficits	as	a	rationale	for	neoliberal	policies.	Essentially	the	project	
of	reducing	public	deficits/debt	and	inflation	control	served	a	similar	
policy	agenda.	Thus,	although	neoliberalism	has	proved	flexible	and	
opportunistic	in	supplying	arguments,	and	in	effecting	some	changes	in	its	
policy	package,	we	argue	that	it	has	been	quite	principled	and	unwavering	
in	its	objectives	and	instruments,	chief	among	them	are	the	agenda	of	
reducing	and	transforming	the	role	of	the	state	and	redistributing	income,	
wealth	and	power	from	labour	to	capital.		
	
Neoliberalism in Canada  
Over	the	past	few	decades	the	neoliberal	policy	paradigm	has	emphasized	
budgetary	austerity,	implementation	of	regressive	taxation,	tax	cuts	for	
corporations,	de‐/re‐regulation	in	a	wide	range	of	areas	previously	subject	
to	regulation,	privatization	in	various	forms	ranging	from	sale	of	assets	to	
the	implementation	of	public‐private	partnerships,	public	sector	reform	
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through	adopting	market‐like	processes	such	as	New	Public	Management,	
and	liberalization	of	the	economy,	in	part	through	the	adoption	of	free	
trade	agreements.	Virtually	every	substantive	policy	area	–	from	industrial	
relations	and	employment	standards,	social	welfare	policy,	employment	
insurance,	education,	through	to	monetary	policy	and	foreign	policy	
reveals	some	impact.		
Jamie	Peck	and	Adam	Tickell	(2002)	have	provided	a	useful	for	
framework	for	analysing	the	various	stages	of	neoliberalism,	though	these	
should	be	considered	heuristically,	rather	than	as	chronological.		In	its	first	
stage,	neoliberalism	began	as	an	intellectual	project,	as	a	critique	of	the	
post‐war	Keynesian	orthodoxy.		Secondly,	in	response	to	global	stagflation	
it	evolved	into	a	political	program	in	the	hands	of	right	wing	politicians	
such	as	the	Ronald	Reagan,	Margaret	Thatcher,	and	Brian	Mulroney.		This	
phase,	Peck	and	Tickell	describe	as	‘roll‐back’	neoliberalization.	The	term	
refers	to	the	process	of	tearing	down	the	old	Keynesian	policy	system	
through	the	introduction	of	monetarism,	budget	and	social	spending	cuts,	
regressive	taxation,	privatization,	and	deregulation	which	all	became	
reigning	policies	of	the	day.			
Though	the	stages	should	not	be	understood	as	being	strictly	
chronological	rolling	back	the	Keynesian	legacy	did	preoccupy	the	first	
decade,	at	least,	of	neoliberal	governments	in	office.	The	focus	was	largely	
on	modifying	the	policies	and	programs	that	had	defined	Keynesianism.	
This	process	was	highly	contested	and	even	if	defenders	lacked	a	
sustainable	alternative	vision	of	how	to	manage	the	post‐Keynesian	
political	economy,	they	could	be	tenacious	in	the	defence	of	the	benefits	it	
had	brought.	Thus,	success	was	not	guaranteed,	and	neoliberal	
governments	for	the	most	part	proceeded	gradually	in	their	practice,	even	
if	their	rhetoric	at	times	suggested	otherwise.	Common	techniques	
included	transforming	universal	into	selective	programs,	tightening	
eligibility	requirements	to	qualify	for	some	benefits	like	unemployment	
insurance,	imposing	ceilings	on	program	costs—or,	alternatively,	making	
them	self‐financing	or	subject	to	“clawbacks”	over	a	certain	benefit	level	
(Houle	1990).	Stephen	Phillips	(2000,	5–6)	noted	that	in	1979	universal	
programs	paid	out	43	percent	of	income	security	benefits	and,	by	1993,	
zero	percent.	Thus,	the	ways	neoliberal	reform	got	implemented	varied	
over	time	and	between	policy	areas,	depending	on	who	had	jurisdiction	in	
federal	systems	(Banting	2005)	and	also	on	how	much	popular	support	
programs	enjoyed.	Moreover,	implementing	the	neoliberal	paradigm	has	
proven	crisis	prone	(McBride	and	Whiteside	2011,	Chapter	5),	and	
responding	to	these	crises	has	necessitated	policy	learning	and	adjustment.	
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There	is	also	comparative	evidence	(see	Hacker	2004)	that	during	this	
period	considerable	incremental	change	was	happening	that	altered	the	
landscape	of	social	policy	in	the	direction	of	stringency	and	austerity	even	
prior	to	the	more	rapid	changes	that,	in	Canada,	resulted	from	the	1995	
federal	budget.	Certainly,	the	picture	of	relentless	incremental	change	
applies	to	some	policy	areas	in	Canada	such	as	unemployment,	since	
renamed	employment	insurance	(see	McBride	1992	Chapter	6;	Campeau	
2005),	and	industrial	relations	(see	Panitch	and	Swartz	2008;	Fudge	2005).	
This	agenda	went	hand‐in‐hand	with	the	drive	for	flexibility	for	employers,	
a	process	in	which,	as	Guy	Standing	(1999,	81)	famously	noted,	“fear	
changed	sides”.	
Though	political	and	economic	elites	had	no	use	for	an	active	state,	
save	in	strictly	delimited	areas	that	promoted	the	neoliberal	agenda,	
polling	evidence	through	the	mid‐1990s	continued	to	show	public	
preference	for	such	a	state	with	job	creation	and	protection	of	social	
programs	central	to	its	mandate	(see	McBride	and	Shields	1997,	78‐9).	In	
this	context,	public	and	social	movement	opposition	to	the	neoliberal	
agenda	was	not	ineffective.	In	the	late	1980s	there	were	signs	that	the	
institutions	of	the	Keynesian	welfare	state	were	proving	resilient	(Banting	
1987;	Mishra	1990).	These	findings	were	consistent	with	comparative	
evidence	on	welfare	state	resilience	(see	Beland	and	de	Chantal	2004;	
Pierson	1994;	Torfing	2001)	and	varieties	of	capitalism	(Hall	and	Soskice	
2002).	The	precise	impact	of	the	Mulroney	government	on	existing	
programs	remained	a	matter	of	debate	in	the	1980s	and	early	1990s.	The	
prevailing	view	in	Canada	was	that	change	was	incremental	and	consisted	
of	erosion	rather	than	outright	dismantling	(Banting	1987,	213);	the	
accumulation	of	incremental	change	was,	however,	setting	the	scene	for	
more	radical	departures	and	in	Canada	the	deep	recession	of	the	early	
1990s	and	ensuing	budget	deficits	provided	the	occasion.	
Similarly,	the	escape	from	the	‘national’	to	the	‘global’	really	only	
took	hold	in	the	mid‐1990s,	some	twenty	years	after	the	dominance	of	
neoliberalism	began	to	be	asserted.	The	1989	Canada	‐	United	States	Free	
Trade	Agreement	was	an	early	indicator	of	this,	but	the	main	
developments	took	place	later,	with	the	implementation	of	the	North	
American	Free	Trade	Agreement	and	the	advent	of	the	World	Trade	
Organization.	These	international	economic	treaties	have	been	variously	
described	–	as	instruments	of	“disciplinary	neoliberalism”	(Gill	1995),	as	
new	or	quasi‐constitutions	(Clarkson	1993),	and	as	“conditioning	
frameworks”	(Grinspun	and	Kreklewich	1994).	Whatever	the	label,	the	
thrust	of	the	analysis	was	that	the	political	effect	of	these	economic	
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agreements	was	to	enhance	and	embed	and	“lock‐in”	economic	liberalism	
and	to	render	it	more	difficult	for	states	to	alter	market	relations.4	
The	1995	federal	budget	is	widely	acknowledged	to	have	marked	a	
fundamental	shift	in	the	role	of	the	federal	state	in	Canada.	Erosion	of	
social	programs	ended;	demolition	began	(Prince	1999;	Kroeger	1996).	
Henceforth,	the	primacy	of	deficit	reduction	over	maintenance	of	the	social	
safety	net	was	absolutely	clear.	This	led	to	declining	federal	transfers	to	
provinces	and	a	fundamental	redesign	of	the	unemployment	benefit	
system.	As	federal	funding	was	diminished,	so	too	were	the	federal	
conditions	attached	to	the	funds.		This	enabled	provinces	to	re‐design	their	
assistance	programs	and,	as	they	implemented	their	own	budget	cutting	
exercises,	to	impose	a	harsh	regime	of	austerity	on	recipients	of	social	
assistance.		
From	the	mid‐1990s	Peck	and	Tickell’s	third	stage	of	the	neoliberal	
project	–	“roll‐out”	began	to	emerge.	Policies	associated	with	this	stage	
included:	social	program	reform	(rather	than	simply	program	cuts),	tax	
expenditures	as	new	forms	of	the	welfare	state	(rather	than	removing	all	
support),	establishing	partnerships	with	the	private	sector	(rather	than	
full‐scale	privatization),	and	re‐regulation	(rather	than	deregulation).		The	
“roll‐back”	and	“roll‐out”	distinction	is	an	important	one	to	make	because	it	
demonstrates	the	ways	in	which	the	neoliberal	project	has	evolved	over	
the	years,	often	out	of	a	need	to	deal	with	the	contradictions	and	
dislocations	that	result	from	its	hallmark	austerity.		However,	it	would	be	
misleading	to	suggest	that	the	“roll‐out”	phase	does	not	itself	promote	
austerity.		Indeed,	as	will	be	shown	in	the	latter	portions	of	this	article,	in	
the	cases	of	income,	wealth,	government	employment,	and	privatization,	
austerity	is	intrinsic	to	the	process.	They	illustrate	the	way	austerity	and	
                                                 
4 Similar  initiatives were undertaken at  the domestic  level  though,  in Parliamentary systems 
where  the  constitutional  doctrine  holds  that  no  Parliament  can  bind  its  successor,  these 
tended to be symbolic rather than binding. This, for example was true of attempts to impose 
balanced budget  legislation.  If  successful, balanced budget  legislation, or  similar  laws which 
limit  fiscal  policy making  powers, would  effectively  eliminate  the  ability  of  government  to 
spend during downturns. Given that tax  increases were also discouraged, or capped through 
legislation,  the  effect  would  be  to  remove  the  Keynesian  policy  option.    Balanced  budget 
legislation  was  enacted  in  most  provinces  and  territories  across  Canada  in  the  1990s.  
Spending cuts were thus encouraged by attempting to lock‐in place neoliberal reasoning, and 
tie the hands of  future governments, should they seek to promote greater social equity and 
full employment. However, it must be noted that the recent economic crisis has prompted at 
least a temporary reprieve from inflexible balanced budget legislation. 
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affluence	have	co‐existed	in	the	neoliberal	experience	and,	if	current	trends	
continue,	will	continue	to	do	so.	
	
Transformations in Neoliberalism 
	Despite	the	preference	for	austerity	that	runs	throughout	the	neoliberal	
period	(regardless	of	the	political	party	holding	power),	thinking	in	terms	
of	phases	–	or	the	temporal	dynamics	of	neoliberalization	–	can	be	a	very	
fruitful	exercise,	revealing	changes	within	this	paradigm	as	it	evolves	to	
deal	with	the	problems	of	legitimacy,	social	reproduction,	and	social	and	
economic	instability	that	are	created	by	its	efforts	to	tear	all	down	barriers	
to	capital	accumulation.		Peck	and	Tickell’s	(2002)	roll‐back	and	roll‐out	
description	of	this	process	referred	to	above	is	but	one	example.		By	the	
early	2000s	other	interesting	theories	were	beginning	to	emerge	as	well	–	
‘inclusive	liberalism’	and	the	‘social	investment	approach’	for	instance.			
Porter	and	Craig	(2004)	and	Mahon	(2008),	for	example,	argue	that	
global	governance	institutions	like	the	Organisation	for	Economic	Co‐
operation	and	Development	and	World	Bank	began	to	modify	their	policy	
position	in	the	1990s	by	adopting	a	new	approach	–	dubbed	‘inclusive	
liberalism’	–	which	is	distinct	in	some	ways	from	earlier	forms	of	
neoliberalism.	Inclusive	liberalism	shares	important	features	with	
neoliberalism	(such	as	an	emphasis	on	the	individual,	an	allegiance	to	a	
capitalist	market	economy	and	the	protection/expansion	of	private	
property,	an	emphasis	on	supply	side	measures	such	as	taxation,	and	
flexibilization	of	the	labour	market),	however	Mahon	(2008,	262)	argues	
that	these	two	approaches	draw	on	different	elements	of	classical	
liberalism,	with	inclusive	liberalism	being	more	oriented	toward	social	
liberalism	and	thus	focused	more	on	redesigning	the	welfare	state	than	on	
dismantlement.	These	new	reforms	emphasize	assistance	and	support	
services,	especially	with	respect	to	taxation	and	benefits	received,	and	
invest	in	human	and	social	capital.		These	ideals	were	absent	from	
neoliberal	paradigm	in	its	early	stages	(Graefe	2006).			
Porter	and	Craig	(2004,	390)	call	this	a	“re‐embedding,	securing	
phase	in	contemporary	liberal	hegemony.”		Importantly,	there	is	a	
defensive	component	to	this	new	phase	as	neoliberalism	failed	in	many	
ways	to	develop	the	components	necessary	to	produce	the	social	fix	
needed	to	promote	widespread	prosperity	and	stability	following	the	
global	accumulation	problems	that	began	in	the	1970s	(see	Jessop	2006).		
This	resulted	in	the	‘lost	decade’	of	international	development	experienced	
in	the	1980s,	the	many	debt	and	financial	crises	witnessed	as	a	result	of	
neoliberal	policies,	the	erosion	of	social	support,	and	the	rise	of	violent	
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protests	against	neoliberal	austerity	and	free	trade;	all	of	which	created	
serious	social	instability	and	a	failure	of	neoliberalism	to	gain	widespread	
legitimacy	(Porter	and	Craig	2004,	391).	
Similarly,	with	domestic	policy	transformations,	Jenson	and	Saint	
Martin	(2003)	argue	that	growing	concern	with	the	social	cohesion	
problems	induced	by	earlier	neoliberal	reforms	prompted	an	evolution	of	
social	policy	in	the	1990s.		They	call	this	new	line	of	thinking	the	‘social	
investment	approach’,	which	adds	an	emphasis	on	social	investment	and	
human	capital	formation	to	older	neoliberal	policy	elements.		In	their	
words,	“high	rates	of	inequality,	low	wages,	poor	jobs,	or	temporary	
deprivation	are	not	a	serious	problem	in	and	of	themselves:	they	are	so	
only	if	individuals	become	trapped	in	those	circumstances	or	if	they	foster	
anti‐social,	exclusionary	behaviours,	such	as	criminality,	dropping	out,	and	
so	on.		They	become	important	when	they	affect	future	life	chances	or	
social	cohesion	in	the	present”	(Jenson	and	Saint	Martin	2003,	92).		Thus	
the	social	investment	approach	is	not	only	a	departure	from	the	post	war	
era	distributive	or	consumption‐oriented	welfare	state,	but	it	is	also	a	
modification	of	the	neoliberal	paradigm.			
Although	distinct,	the	common	thread	that	runs	throughout	
descriptions	of	roll‐out	neoliberalization,	inclusive	liberalism,	and	the	rise	
of	a	social	investment	approach	is	the	recognition	that	by	the	late	1990s	
the	search	was	on	for	how	to	make	greater	market‐reliance5	a	viable	and	
sustainable	political	project	in	the	long	run.		One	important	factor	that	has	
inhibited	this	search	from	becoming	a	transition	away	from	neoliberalism,	
rather	than	being	a	change	within	neoliberalism,	is	that	any	new	policy	
thinking	and	program	redesign	has	continued	to	operate	within	the	context	
of	strict	neoliberal	fiscal	austerity.6		Thus	when	evaluating	whether	
neoliberalism	has	been	displaced	by	these	new	models,	or	whether	these	
represent	varieties	of	neoliberalism,	it	is	useful	to	keep	in	mind	Joseph	
Schumpeter’s	insightful	quip	that	the	public	budget	is	the	‘skeleton	of	the	
state	stripped	of	all	misleading	ideologies’.		We	therefore	understand	the	
rise	of	inclusive	liberalism	or	new	social	investment	approaches	as	new	
faces	of	the	neoliberal	project	rather	than	rival	paradigms.			
                                                 
5 For example, Jenson and St. Martin (2003, 94) point out that in Canada ‘in‐work benefits’ are 
the new  instrument of choice, where government covers  the difference between needs and 
market  income by adopting a strategy of “making work pay”  (e.g.,  the  federal Canada Child 
Tax Benefit and similar provincial child tax benefits).  
6 For example, see the section on welfare incomes below.  
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As	the	statistics	examined	in	the	following	sections	clearly	indicate,	
to	whatever	extent	decision	makers	may	have	articulated	new	policy	
models,	it	has	not	led	to	an	actual	improvement	in	the	in	the	material	
conditions	of	most	Canadians.		For	some	indicators	of	overall	social	
wellbeing	(e.g.,	income	distribution	and	public	sector	employment),	gains	
made	in	the	2000s	have	only	managed	to	partially	restore	what	was	
stripped	away	in	the	1980s	and	1990s;	while	for	other	indicators	(e.g.,	
welfare	incomes,	wealth	distribution,	and	real	wages),	austerity	and	
market‐reliance	has	led	to	an	entrenchment	of	inequalities.		Altogether	this	
suggests	that	despite	the	interesting	temporal	dynamics	at	play	during	the	
neoliberal	period,	it	remains	consistently	marked	by	fiscal	austerity,	
deterioration	in	the	position	of	the	majority	(the	middle	class	in	
particular),	and	rising	affluence	for	a	minority	of	Canadians.						
	
Income Distribution 
In	a	market‐based	society,	one’s	standard	of	living	is	largely	dependent	on	
income	secured	through	the	labour	market,	a	reality	made	all	the	more	
conspicuous	due	to	the	neoliberal	erosion	of	the	welfare	state	through	
fiscal	austerity	and	program	reform.		Disparities	in	income	distribution	are	
a	good	indicator	of	the	relative	level	of	fairness	and	wellbeing	in	a	society.		
As	disparities	rise,	so	too	do	inequalities.			The	statistical	data	accumulated	
over	the	neoliberal	period	in	Canada	clearly	indicates	that	income	
disparities	are	on	the	rise	(with	both	market	and	after‐tax	incomes);	and	
gains	from	economic	growth	are	being	disproportionately	captured	by	
those	most	well	off	(and	to	an	increasing	degree).	
	
Rising	Income	Disparity	
Incomes	have	risen	in	Canada	over	the	past	thirty	years,	with	the	average	
market	income	increasing	by	nearly	17	percent,	from	$54,300	in	1978	to	
$63,300	in	2008	(in	2008	constant	dollars).7		However,	gains	from	rising	
incomes	have	been	disproportionately	captured	by	the	highest	earners.		
Two	ways	to	track	these	changes	are	by	comparing	the	average	earnings	of	
income	quintiles	over	time,	and	by	examining	changes	in	the	share	of	
market	income	captured	by	each	quintile.	Both	indicate	rising	income	
disparity	in	Canada.			
First,	members	of	the	highest	income	quintile	made	35	percent	
more	in	2008	than	they	did	in	1978	(an	increase	of	$42,500),	while	the	
                                                 
7 Market  income  is composed of earnings wages, salaries and commission, self‐employment 
income, farm income, investment income, retirement pensions. 
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lowest	quintile	made	only	6	percent	more	(an	increase	of	$200).		Mid‐
range	incomes	(60	percent	of	Canadians)	nudged	up	slightly,	increasing	by	
1.5	percent	(an	increase	of	$2,200	(see	Table	1)).		Averaged	over	the	thirty‐
year	period,	income‐earners	in	the	lowest	quintile	achieved	a	derisory	$6‐7	
per	year	increase	in	real	incomes.	Moreover,	the	increases	for	most	people	
were	concentrated	in	the	final	years	of	the	2000s	boom,	just	before	the	
economic	crisis	hit.	The	bottom	sixty	per	cent	of	income‐earners	were	
substantially	worse	off	in	2003,	after	25	years	of	neoliberalism,	than	they	
had	been	in	1978,	and	the	next	twenty	per	cent	were	only	marginally	
better	off.	
	
Table	1	
Average	Market	Income	($)	
2008	constant	dollars	
	 1978	 1983	 1988	 1993	 1998	 2003	 2008	
		Lowest	quintile	 3,500	 2,400 2,900 1,200 1,300 3,000	 3,700	
		Second	quintile	 26,100	 21,100 22,900 16,100 17,300 20,900	 23,400
		Third	quintile	 48,700	 43,500 46,300 38,500 39,900 43,300	 47,100
		Fourth	quintile	 71,000	 67,200 72,100 64,800 68,000 71,800	 77,500
		Highest	quintile	 122,200	 120,200 128,500 120,700 138,200 148,400	 164,700
Statistics Canada Table 202‐0701  
	
	 Second,	the	share	of	market	income	gains	in	the	neoliberal	period	is	
also	increasingly	hoarded	by	the	wealthy,	all	while	no	improvement	in	the	
position	of	the	poorest	has	been	made,	and	middle	income	earners	have	
increasingly	lost	ground	over	the	past	thirty	years	(see	table	2).		In	1978	
the	highest	income	quintile	captured	45	percent	of	all	income	in	Canada,	
yet	by	2008	this	share	had	increased	to	52.1	percent.		The	lowest	income	
quintile	had	a	1.3	percent	share	in	1978,	and	this	remained	nearly	identical	
in	2008	(1.2	percent).		As	for	the	other	60	percent	of	Canadians	–	second,	
third,	and	fourth	income	quintiles	experienced	a	loss	in	their	share	of	total	
income	over	that	same	period,	by	2.2	percent,	3	percent,	and	1.6	percent	
respectively.		
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Table	2	
Share	of	Market	Income	(%)	
	 1978 1983 1993 1998 2003	 2008	
		Lowest	quintile	 1.3	 0.9	 0.5	 0.5	 1	 1.2	
		Second	quintile	 9.6	 8.3	 6.7	 6.5	 7.3	 7.4	
		Third	quintile	 17.9	 17.1	 16	 15.1	 15.1	 14.9	
		Fourth	quintile	 26.1	 26.4	 26.9	 25.7	 25	 24.5	
		Highest	quintile	 45	 47.2	 50	 52.2	 51.6	 52.1	
Statistics Canada Table 202‐0701  
Similar	to	market	incomes,	average	after‐tax	incomes	are	also	on	
the	rise	in	Canada,	growing	by	almost	17	percent	between	1978	and	2008,	
from	$51,000	to	$59,500	(in	2008	constant	dollars).8		Under	the	Keynesian	
welfare	state	model,	some	measure	of	market	income	inequality	was	
intentionally	reduced	through	the	implementation	of	progressive	taxation	
systems.		In	the	neoliberal	era	redistribution	still	occurs,	yet	after‐tax	
income	inequalities	are	growing.		The	Canadian	state	is	therefore	
implicated	in	their	growth.		As	table	3	indicates	below,	the	average	after‐
tax	income	of	the	wealthiest	20	percent	has	increased	by	29	percent	
($29,400)	since	1978,	while	the	after‐tax	incomes	of	the	poorest	have	
increased	on	average	by	only	20	percent	($2,400).			
	
Table	3		
Average	After‐Tax	Income	($)	
2008	constant	dollars	
	 1978	 1983	 1988	 1993	 1998	 2003	 2008	
		Lowest	quintile	 12,100	 12,200 13,900 12,600 11,800 13,200	 14,500	
		Second	quintile	 30,000	 27,500 28,900 26,100 26,500 28,900	 31,500	
		Third	quintile	 46,500	 42,700 44,000 40,000 40,700 44,300	 48,500	
		Fourth	quintile	 63,600	 59,900 61,900 57,500 59,900 64,900	 71,200	
		Highest	quintile	 102,500	 98,600 101,600 95,500 106,500 117,500	 131,900
Statistics	Canada	Table	202‐0701		
	
Despite	now	having	a	taxation	system	that	does	not	significantly	dampen	
disparities,	and	keeping	in	mind	that	the	after‐tax	incomes	of	the	bottom	
20	percent	remain	at	near	subsistence	levels,	it	is	worth	pointing	out	how	
important	this	vestige	of	the	Keynesian	welfare	state	remains.		Comparing	
the	lowest	quintile	table	1	figures	to	those	of	table	3	makes	it	evident	that	
                                                 
8 After tax income is defined as total income minus income tax. (Total income is composed of 
market income plus government transfers.) 
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redistribution	is	essential	for	propping	up	purchasing	power	and	providing	
for	some	modicum	of	social	wellbeing	given	the	meagre	income	secured	by	
those	pushed	to	the	margins	of	the	labour	market	in	Canada.					
The	share	of	after‐tax	incomes	is	also	growing	increasingly	uneven,	
although	the	magnitude	of	this	disparity	is	lower.		The	share	of	income	
captured	by	the	lowest	quintile	remains	flat	(increasing	by	only	0.2	percent	
over	30	years),	while	the	highest	quintile	has	experienced	gains	of	4	
percent	and	the	middle	60	percent	have	lost	4.3	percent	of	their	share	of	
total	after	tax‐income	in	Canada	(table	4).	
	
Table	4	
Share	of	after‐tax	income	(%)
	 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003	 2008
		Lowest	quintile	 4.7	 5.1	 5.5	 5.5	 4.8	 4.9	 4.9	
		Second	quintile	 11.8	 11.4	 11.5	 11.3	 10.8	 10.7	 10.6	
		Third	quintile	 18.3	 17.7	 17.6	 17.3	 16.6	 16.5	 16.3	
		Fourth	quintile	 25	 24.9	 24.7	 24.8	 24.4	 24.1	 23.9	
		Highest	quintile	 40.3	 40.9	 40.6	 41.2	 43.4	 43.7	 44.3	
Statistics Canada Table 202‐0701  
	
As	helpful	as	the	quintile	breakdown	is	for	uncovering	income	disparities,	
what	this	measurement	obscures	is	just	how	much	better	off	the	very	
highest	income	earners	in	Canada	are.		Amongst	the	richest	5	percent	of	
the	population,	the	top	1	percent	captured	more	than	90	percent	of	all	
income	gains	made	by	this	group,	and	half	of	that	was	absorbed	by	the	
richest	0.1	percent	(Mackenzie	2009b).	
	
Stagnant	Real	Wages	for	Most	Canadians,	but	the	Rich	Keep	Getting	Richer	
Not	only	are	disparities	amongst	income	groups	on	the	rise	in	Canada,	but	
real	hourly	wages	increased	by	only	0.8	percent	per	year	compared	to	
increased	labour	productivity	averaging1.3	percent	per	annum	between	
1981	and	2008		(IOW	2009,	15).		Thus,	Canadian	median	wages	and	
salaries,	adjusted	for	inflation,	have	not	grown	for	thirty	years	(Laxer	2009,	
54).		This	is	consistent	with	Marx’s	(1977)	description	of	exploitation	–	the	
extraction	of	absolute	surplus	value	and	relative	surplus	value	from	labour.		
The	former	is	increased	through	a	lengthening	of	the	working	day	and	the	
latter	through	an	increase	in	productivity.	Chernomas	(1999)	argued	that	
both	are	salient	features	of	production	under	neoliberalism,	more	people	
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now	do	work	longer	hours,	and	wages	have	not	improved	despite	rising	
productivity.			
It	should	come	as	no	surprise	that	the	most	affluent	are	exempt	
from	these	stagnant	wage	trends,	yet	it	is	startling	to	see	just	how	much	
richer	the	rich	have	become.		In	1995	the	average	total	compensation	of	
the	50	highest	paid	executives	in	Canada	was	$2.66	million,	roughly	85	
times	the	pay	of	the	average	worker;	by	2007	they	were	making	398	times	
the	average	amount	(Mackenzie	2009b).		The	average	earnings	of	the	top	
100	Canadian	CEOs	even	increased	by	22	percent	in	one	year	alone	–	from	
$8.5	million	in	2006	to	$10,408,054	in	2007	(ibid).		The	2009/10	recession	
also	emphasized	the	level	economic	security	experienced	by	the	most	
affluent	–	in	2009	Canada’s	top	100	CEOs	earned	155	times	what	the	
average	Canadian	earned,	up	from	104	in	1998	(Mackenzie	2011).	
	
Wealth Distribution 
Similar	to	income	distribution,	wealth	concentration	is	on	the	rise.	The	
wealthiest	Canadians	continue	to	grow	disproportionately	wealthy	and	
have	captured	an	ever	larger	share	of	total	wealth	generated	during	the	
neoliberal	era.		Understanding	what	is	happening	with	the	distribution	of	
wealth	in	this	country	is	important.	It	helps	shed	light	on	the	implications	
of	state	austerity	and	neoliberal	wage‐compression,	given	that	working	
class	households	must	now	borrow	in	order	to	maintain	their	standard	of	
living	in	the	face	of	stagnant	or	declining	real	wages	and	the	retreat	of	
welfare	state	support.		In	Canada	household	debt	as	a	percentage	of	
personal	disposal	income	was	roughly	80	percent	in	1990,	yet	increased	to	
100	percent	by	2002,	and	reached	nearly	140	percent	by	2008	(Baragar	
2009,	82).		As	a	corollary,	the	personal	savings	rate	in	Canada	dropped	
from	20.2	percent	of	disposable	income	in	1982,	to	below	10	percent	in	
1994,	and	finally	to	a	low	of	2	percent	in	2005	(ibid).			The	consequences	of	
the	neoliberal	high‐debt,	stagnant	wage	model	were	made	clear	during	the	
most	recent	financial	crisis:	many	households	borrowed	against	the	value	
of	their	homes,	maxed	out	their	credit	cards,	and	had	little	or	no	savings	to	
cushion	the	blow	once	the	bubble	burst.			
Tracking	changes	in	wealth	distribution	thus	provides	some	insight	
into	the	economic	(in)security	of	Canadians.	Wealth	can	be	drawn	on	to	
cushion	the	blow	of	economic	downturns,	and	also	reduces	dependence	on	
the	labour	market	by,	for	example,	allowing	one	the	flexibility	to	reduce	
work	hours,	or	to	pursue	self‐employment	(Morissette	and	Zhang	2006).		A	
lack	of	assets	or	high	levels	of	personal	indebtedness	eliminates	these	
options.	
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Since	1984	the	median	wealth	of	the	bottom	40	percent	of	
Canadians	has	declined,	in	some	cases	dramatically.			Between	1984	and	
2005,	the	level	of	indebtedness	for	bottom	10	percent	of	households	has	
increased	on	average	by	$7,500;	and	for	the	next	ten	percent	wealth	was	
nearly	completely	eliminated.		The	top	10	percent,	by	contrast,	nearly	
doubled	their	average	household	wealth,	as	it	increased	by	$659,020	in	
that	same	period	(table	5).	
	
Table	5	
Median	Wealth	(2005	$)	
	 1984	 1999	 2005	
Bottom	10%	 ‐2,100	 ‐6,570	 ‐9,600	
Second	 780	 120	 10	
Third		 7,770	 6,820	 6,000	
Fourth	 24,630	 26,150	 25,500	
Fifth	 52,260	 57,120	 63,250	
Sixth	 83,130	 93,850	 109,050	
Seventh	 120,690	 148,610	 173,590	
Eighth	 170,210	 221,770	 263,000	
Ninth	 256,740	 344,890	 413,750	
Top	10%	 534,980	 723,590	 1,194,000	
Morissette & Zhang. 2006. 
	
Wealth	has	also	grown	more	concentrated	during	the	neoliberal	
period.		As	indicated	on	table	6,	the	bottom	forty	percent	have	maintained	
roughly	the	same	relative	share	of	wealth	over	the	neoliberal	period,	the	
next	fifty	percent	have	lost	some	ground,	and	the	top	10	percent	of	
Canadian	households	are	now	capturing	a	greater	share	of	total	wealth	
(increasing	by	6.4	percent).		
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Table	6	
Share	of	Wealth	(%)	
	 1984	 1999	 2005	
Bottom	10%	 ‐0.5	 ‐0.6	 ‐0.6	
Second	 0.1	 0	 0	
Third		 0.5	 0.4	 0.2	
Fourth	 1.7	 1.3	 1.1	
Fifth	 3.5	 2.8	 2.5	
Sixth	 5.6	 4.7	 4.4	
Seventh	 8.2	 7.4	 6.9	
Eighth	 11.5	 11	 10.5	
Ninth	 17.5	 17.4	 16.8	
Top	10%	 51.8	 55.7	 58.2	
Morissette and Zhang. 2006.  
	
Welfare Incomes 
The	neoliberal	policy	message	is	clear:	securing	employment	through	the	
labour	market	must	be	encouraged,	irrespective	of	the	social	costs.		The	
notion	that	the	market	alone	should	be	relied	on	for	wellbeing	might	
initially	appear	farcical	in	the	face	of	decades‐long	stagnant	or	declining	
market	incomes	and	ever‐growing	wealth	concentrations	(see	tables	1	and	
5);	yet	it	is	a	message	that	is	powerfully	reinforced	through	decades	of	
fiscal	austerity,	leading	to	a	dramatic	decline	in	the	generosity	of	welfare	
benefits,	“making	life	more	difficult	for	the	nearly	1.7	million	children,	
women	and	men	who	rel[y]	on	welfare”	(NCW	2007,	66).9		The	annual	
Welfare	Incomes10	publication	produced	by	the	National	Council	of	Welfare	
(e.g.	NCW	2007,	2010)	documents	the	implications	of	this	austerity.		For	
many	family	scenarios,	welfare	incomes	in	2006	and	2007	were	at	their	
lowest	point	since	1986	(NCW	2007,	68).		The	situation	improved	slightly	
in	2009	as	welfare	incomes	were	higher	than	in	2008,	yet	nonetheless	they	
remained	“consistently	far	below	most	socially	accepted	measures	of	
adequacy”	(NCW	2010,	v).		This	decline	can	be	attributed	mainly	to	rising	
                                                 
9 The 1996  federal spending and program changes  that were made with  the  introduction of 
the Canada Health  and  Social  Transfer  (CHST)  allowed  for  considerable  experimentation by 
provinces  in  the  redesigning of assistance programs.   Along with  the  tightening of eligibility 
and  benefit  levels  came  a  dramatic  reduction  in  the  number  of  Canadians  able  to  rely  on 
government assistance.   Since  then  the number of welfare  recipients have been cut  in half, 
declining from just over 3 million people in 1995 to 1.68 million in 2005 (NCW 2006). 
10 Welfare incomes are defined as social assistance plus child benefits and tax credits.   
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inflation,	as	the	majority	of	welfare	incomes	did	not	keep	pace	with	the	
45.9	percent	increase	in	the	cost	of	living	that	occurred	between	1990	and	
2009.		This	left	many	worse	off	now	than	recipients	in	previous	decades,	
with	welfare	incomes	dropping	by	20	percent	in	some	cases	(NCW	2010,	
vii).			
Single	people	classified	as	‘employable’	fare	the	worst.		Depending	
on	the	measure	used,	this	family	type	receives	an	income	that	is	between	
24	percent	(at	worst)	and	64	percent	(at	best)	of	the	poverty	line.		These	
incomes	amount	to	only	15	to	38	percent	of	the	after‐tax	income	of	average	
Canadian	single	member	households,	“making	it	apparent	just	how	
excluded	some	social	assistance	recipients	are	from	mainstream	Canadian	
life”	(NCW	2010,	viii).		Although	other	family	types	(such	as	a	single	person	
with	a	disability,	a	lone	parent	household,	or	a	couple	with	two	children	or	
more)	may	fare	marginally	better,	it	is	worth	emphasizing	that	poor	
economic	conditions	(the	crisis	and	recession)	have	left	many	Canadians	
with	no	option	but	to	turn	to	social	assistance	once	their	Employment	
Insurance	benefits	have	run	out.11		These	individuals	are	thus	doubly	
punished,	first	by	the	market	and	then	by	the	state	as	dismal	welfare	
benefits	push	them	far	below	the	poverty	line.		
On	top	of	the	reduced	purchasing	power	and	eroded	standard	of	
living	experienced	by	welfare	recipients,	those	in	need	of	social	assistance	
must	now	also	contend	with	more	punitive,	workfare‐oriented	social	
programs	which	make	qualifying	for	and	maintaining	assistance	very	
difficult,	especially	for	the	homeless	(Wallace	et	al.	2006;	Bezanson	2006).		
Changes	made	at	the	provincial	level	since	the	1990s	have	been	dramatic.		
In	British	Columbia	neoliberal	program	reform	has	been	described	as	
“unprecedented	in	Canada”	as	eligibility	rules	have	been	tightened	and	the	
application	process	altered	such	that	those	most	in	need	of	help	are	
“discouraged,	delayed	and	denied”	and	many	are	“diverted	to	
homelessness,	charities,	and	increased	hardship”	(see	Wallace	et	al.	2006,	
6‐7).		Thus	austerity	is	not	only	a	means	to	an	end	(lower	government	
debt/deficits),	but	is	also	tied	into	a	social	shift	in	which	economic	security	
is	far	less	assured	and	precariousness	is	reinforced.	
	
	
	
                                                 
11 Employment Insurance has also become far less generous, with 2008 coverage reduced, 
duration of benefits decreased, and qualification period extended compared to 1981 levels 
(see Sharpe and Arsenault 2009). 
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Size of the Public Sector 
	
Public	Sector	Employment	 	
Another	implication	of	state	spending	austerity	is	a	decline	in	the	number	
of	people	working	in	the	public	sector.	Government	employment	between	
1990	and	1999	fell	by	9	per	cent	(McBride	2005,	102).	In	the	early	2000s	
this	trend	was	reversed	to	a	degree.	The	number	of	public	sector	
employees	at	the	provincial	and	federal	level	did	increase	in	those	years.	
However,	as	a	percentage	of	the	total	labour	force	government	
employment	seemed	to	have	experienced	a	permanent	decline:	from	21.25	
of	the	labour	force	in	1990,	to	17.5	in	1999,	to	17.0	in	March	2003,	and	
after	years	of	“boom,”	only	18	percent	in	2009	(compiled	using	Statistics	
Canada	CANSIM	data,	table	183‐0002	“Public	Sector	Employment”).	
Despite	economic	growth,	the	imprint	of	the	public	sector	in	employment	
terms	was	reduced.		Future	cuts	to	the	public	sector	also	appear	imminent	
as	the	2010‐11	federal	budget	seeks	to	save	$17.6	billion	over	five	years	
through	“streamlining	and	reducing	the	operating	and	administrative	costs	
of	government	departments”	(Evans	2010).		
	
Privatization	
Privatization	is	promoted	as	a	mechanism	for	reducing	state	debt/deficit	
levels	and	as	a	way	of	enhancing	the	efficiency	of	goods	and	services	
provision.	The	initial	wave	of	privatization	in	Canada	targeted	federal	and	
provincial	Crown	corporations,	and	was	most	popular	from	the	mid‐1980s	
to	the	mid‐1990s	(see	McBride	2005,	103‐4).		Privatization	tended	to	occur	
within	sectors	that	were	strategically	important	for	the	functioning	of	the	
Keynesian	welfare	state	(e.g.,	energy	and	transportation).		They	were	also	
the	most	potentially	profitable	sectors	of	direct	state	involvement	and	thus	
privatization	proved	to	be	a	boon	for	the	private	sector	while	hardly	being	
justifiable	as	a	form	of	fiscal	austerity	given	that	a	stream	of	remittances	
was	been	traded	for	a	single	(often	devalued)	lump	sum	payment.	
Once	the	most	promising	state	owned	enterprises	were	sold,	new	
forms	of	privatization	by	stealth	began	to	emerge	–	such	as	public‐private	
partnerships	(P3s)	with	the	for‐profit	private	sector	–	which,	despite	being	
also	justified	under	the	rubric	of	fiscal	austerity,	are	often	far	more	costly	
(economically	and	socially)	than	traditional	service	and	infrastructure	
delivery	methods.		Evidence	of	this	abounds	in	the	Canadian	empirical	
record,	two	prime	examples	being	the	Abbotsford	Regional	Hospital	P3	and	
the	Brampton	Civic	Hospital	P3.		Despite	claims	that	these	P3s	could	
deliver	better	value	for	money	than	the	traditional	public	procurement	
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method	(Partnerships	BC	2005;	Daily	Commercial	News	2001),	both	
actually	ended	up	costing	the	taxpayer	far	more.			
First,	there	are	hidden	fees	that	uniquely	accompany	P3s.		With	the	
Abbotsford	hospital,	the	BC	provincial	government	spent	over	$7	million	in	
administrative	costs,	and	$24.7	million	on	legal	and	consultant	costs	
(Partnerships	BC	2005,	34).	Similarly,	with	the	Brampton	hospital,	the	
Ontario	provincial	government	paid	$33.9	million	to	advisors	subsequent	
to	the	selection	of	the	preferred	bidder	(Auerbach	et	al.	2003,	9).		
Second,	privately	financed	infrastructure	also	costs	more	due	to	the	
higher	interest	rates	typically	secured	by	private	sector	borrowers.		Prior	
to	2007,	private	partner	borrowing	costs	exceeded	public	costs	by	two	
percent,	amounting	to	a	60	percent	increase	in	total	financing	costs	when	
measured	in	present	value	terms.		This	spread	then	increased	to	three	or	
four	percent	on	average	in	2007‐9	due	to	the	global	financial	crisis,	
amounting	to	a	70	percent	increase	in	total	financing	costs	(Mackenzie	
2009a,	2).			
Finally,	P3	value	for	money	is	often	more	rhetoric	than	reality.		In	
the	case	of	the	Brampton	P3	hospital,	the	Auditor	General	of	Ontario	found	
that	going	with	the	traditional	method	would	have	saved	taxpayers	$200	
million	(Office	of	the	Auditor	General	of	Ontario	2008,	117).	In	analyzing	
the	Abbotsford	project,	forensic	accountants	Parks	and	Terhart	concluded	
that	the	methodology	used	to	determine	value	for	money	was	“biased	in	
favour	of	the	P3”	and	had	best	practice	methods	been	followed,	a	publicly	
delivered	hospital	would	have	produced	a	savings	of	roughly	$80	million	
when	compared	to	the	P3	option	(2009,	10).		The	higher	costs	associated	
with	P3	use	not	only	undermines	proponents’	arguments	that	they	help	
curb	wasteful	government	spending,	but	it	also	means	that	less	is	available	
to	be	spent	on	much	needed	social	concerns	and	infrastructure	projects.		
	
Conclusion 
The	vast	majority	of	Canadians	are	punished	twice	by	the	neoliberal	
regime,	first	through	the	labour	market	and	then	by	the	state.		Structural	
changes	in	the	economy	have	meant	three	decades	of	decline	for	the	
majority:	stagnant	or	shrunken	market	incomes,	a	reduced	share	of	
national	wealth,	and	a	dramatic	rise	of	household	indebtedness.		Alongside	
this	inability	of	the	neoliberal	economy	to	provide	for	social	wellbeing,	
state	policy	now	punishes	those	most	in	need	through	draconian	spending	
restraint	and	program	reforms	which	actually	push	some	families	further	
into	poverty.		Yet	this	shift	from	a	welfare	state	to	a	miserly	state	is	far	
from	consistent	across	social	classes.		Whether	one	considers	the	multi‐
	Socialist	Studies	/	Études	socialistes		7(1/2)	Spring/Fall	2011:	42‐64	
60 
billion	dollar	bailouts	recently	offered	to	leading	capitalist	sectors	(auto	
and	banking),	or	the	ever‐growing	use	of	P3s	that	often	throw	millions	of	
unnecessary	taxpayer	dollars	into	private	coffers	with	each	new	project,	
neoliberal	policy	has	proven	quite	generous	for	some.		Further,	in	contrast	
to	the	income	stagnation	and	wealth	erosion	experienced	at	the	bottom	
and	by	the	middle	class	over	thirty	years,	the	position	of	the	wealthy	has	
improved	dramatically	–	incomes	and	assets	are	growing,	as	are	their	
shares	of	each.		Thus	to	the	familiar	neoliberal	rhetoric	of	belt	tightening	
and	market‐reliance	must	be	added	the	reality	of	abundance	and	state	
support	experienced	by	the	few	who	benefit	from	its	logic.		Austerity	has	
been	a	salient	policy	feature	over	the	past	thirty	years,	yet	it	has	also	been	
selective.		Posing	the	question	‘austerity	for	whom?’	forces	us	to	recognize	
that	not	only	has	this	been	a	permanent	feature	of	the	neoliberal	period	for	
many	but	it	is	also	inexorably	intertwined	with	growing	affluence	
experienced	by	those	few	who	are	most	well	off	in	Canadian	society.		
The	neoliberal	regime	has	triggered	a	series	of	regional	crises	which	
impoverished	millions	of	people	around	the	world,	culminating	a	global	
financial	crisis	in	2007.			For	a	time	this	crisis	seemed	to	shake	neoliberal	
certainties	to	their	foundations.	Emergency	measures	included	bailouts,	
nationalizations,	budgetary	stimulus,	financial	easing	and	a	host	of	other	
initiatives	designed	to	get	credit	and	job	creation	moving.	Although	a	
global	recession	did	follow	the	financial	crisis	and	credit‐crunch,	the	
stimulus	packages	put	in	place	averted	a	more	serious	situation.	However,	
these	measures	were	intended	to	rescue	the	neoliberal	project,	not	to	bury	
it.	Once	slender	signs	of	a	recovery	appeared,	policy	discussions	turned	to	
the	issue	of	how	quickly	emergency	measures	could	be	terminated	and	
“sound	finance”	restored.	Meanwhile	the	vast	sums	expended	in	bailing	out	
financial	institutions	deemed	“too	big	to	fail”	had	to	be	repaid.	A	new	age	of	
austerity	looms	in	which	state	budgets	and	particularly	social	programs	
will	be	ravaged	to	pay	for	the	excesses	of	financiers.	So	popular	is	the	
return	to	austerity	that	according	to	Paul	Krugman	(2010):	“the	idea	that	
what	depressed	economies	really	need	is	even	more	suffering	seems	to	be	
the	new	conventional	wisdom”.	The	new	era	of	austerity,	however,	is	
nothing	new.		Looked	at	in	historical	context,	it	is	simply	a	crisis‐driven	
intensification	of	longer	term	trends	that	are	intrinsic	to	the	neoliberal	
model.		
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